Regis Property v. Dudley by Kernerman, Robert M.
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 2, Number 1 (April 1960) Article 15
Regis Property v. Dudley
Robert M. Kernerman
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Commentary
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Kernerman, Robert M.. "Regis Property v. Dudley." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 2.1 (1960) : 163-167.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol2/iss1/15
Case Comment
Lastly he states that the penalty for committing perjury is not
that one should be asked to pay damages but that he should be
sentenced for the crime which he has committed. This harks back
to the rule against double punishment which is clearly no longer
valid law. Thus, there would appear to be no valid explanation why
the injured party should be barred from indemnification, which
would in addition, serve as a further deterrent against perjury.
In conclusion it is submitted that the only true basis for Lord
Goddard's judgment is that precedent prevents such an action. This
rests on the old basis of the absolute privilege principle not to deter
the free flow of witnesses. This principle has been undermined by
the sanctions now enforced and thus there is little reason to allow
this historical dogma to dictate modern thought.
Undoubtedly, however, legislation is now necessary to make
perjury tortious. It is no longer sufficient to state, as the courts
have done, that the "world has gone on very well without such
actions". 25 The truth is that much hardship has occurred.
H. LORNE MORPHY
REGIS PROPERTY V. DUDLEY - LANDLORD AND TENANT - REPAIRS -
EXCEPTION OF FAIR WEAR AND TEAR - EFFECT OF ExcEpTIoN - The
recent House of Lords decision in Regis Property Co. Ltd. v. Dudley1
seems to have resulted in a new interpretation of the fair wear and
tear exception clause found in the tenant's repairing covenant of
most leases. A sample of a covenant to repair may be found in the
Short Form of Leases Act.2 The previous law as stated in Taylor
v. Webb 3 appears to have been overruled.
Before discussing what the fair wear and tear exception is, and
how it may now be redefined, it is necessary to review the law prior
to the Taylor v. Webb case, as an aid in seeing how the court in
Regis Property arrived at its present position.
In Gutteridge v. Munyard,4 Tindal C.J. stated the effect, of a
repairing covenant containing an exception of reasonable wear and
tear in these words:
What the natural operation of time flowing on effects, and all that the
elements bring about in diminishing the value, constitute a loss, which,
so far as it results from time and nature, falls upon the landlord. But
25 S upra, footnote 7, at p. 141.
-Mr. Morphy is in the Third year at Osgoode Hall Law School.1 [1958] 3 All E.R. 491 (H.L.).
2R.S.O. 1950, c. 361. "And also will, during the said term, well and
sufficiently repair, maintain, amend and keep the said demised premises
with the appurtenances in good and substantial repair, and all fixtures and
things thereto belonging, or which at any time during the said term shall be
erected and made by the lessor, when, where, and so often as need shall be,
reasonable wear and tear and damage by fire, lightning and tempest only
excepted."
3 [1937] 1 All E.R. 590.
4173 E.R. 57, (1834), 7 Car. & P. 129, 174 E.R. 114, (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 334.
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the tenant is to take care that the premises do not suffer more than the
operation of time and nature would effect; he is bound by seasonable
applications of labour to keep the house as nearly as possible in the
same condition as when it was demised.5
It should be noted that the exception clause protects the tenant here,
and that he is responsible only for damage other than that governed
by the fair wear and tear exception. He is responsible also for dam-
age from abnormal operation of the elements.
In Lister v. Lane and Neshan,6 Lord Esher M.R., in affirming
the Gutteridge decision, said:
The effects of natural causes upon such a house in the course of
time-are results from time and nature which fall upon the landlord,
and they are not a breach of the covenant to repair.7
This definition of the exception clause was applied in Terrell v.
Murrays and in Buttimer v. Betty.9
In 1928, Talbot J. expanded the meaning of the fair wear and
tear exception in the case of Haskell v. Marlow.10 Here a husband
had left a dwelling house and garden to his wife for life, the wife
"keeping the same in good repair and condition, (reasonable wear
and tear excepted)". The wife did nothing actively to injure the
house and premises, but did little to counteract the natural process
of decay. The plaintiff trustees of the husband's will claimed the
wife had breached the will's terms by neglecting to keep the premises
in good repair and condition, (reasonable wear and tear excepted).
Talbot J. in a now famous judgment (re-echoed in Regis Property)
said:
...aThe tenant (for life or years) is bound to keep the house in good
repair and condition, but is not liable for what is due to reasonable
wear and tear... If any want of repair is alleged and proved in fact,
it lies on the tenant to show that it comes within the exception .
reasonable wear and tear means the reasonable use of the house by
the tenant and the ordinary operation of natural forces. The exception
of want of repair due to wear and tear must be construed as limited
to what is directly due to wear and tear, reasonable conduct on the part
of the tenant being assumed .... He is bound to do such repairs as may
be required to prevent the consequences flowing originally from wear
and tear from producing others which wear and tear would not directly
produce.11 (Italics mine.)
It appeared that the tenants were responsible for consequential
damage resulting from fair wear and tear.
However, in 1937, the Court of Appeal in Taylor v. Webb 12 dis-
approved of the reasoning of Talbot J. in Haskell v. Marlow and
held that the clause relieved the tenant not only from the immediate
5174 E.R. 114 at 115, also quoted in Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant,
25th edition, 1954, at p. 765.
6 [1893] 2 Q.B. 212 (C.A.).
7 Ibid. at p. 217.
8 (1901), 17 Times L.R. 570.
9 (1914), 26 W.L.R. 705, 6 W.W.R. 22 (B.C.).
10 [1928] 2 K.B. 45.
1_ Ibid. at pp. 58, 59.
32 Supra, footnote 3.
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effects of wear and tear, but also from the obligation to take any
steps to avert any consequential damage. The facts of that case are
unusual, and are stated in the headnote as follows:
A landlord covenanted in an underlease to keep the outside walls and
roofs in tenantable repair, as he was required by the headlease to do.
The covenant in the headlease contained an exception of damage by
fire, and fair wear and tear. Owing solely, as it was found, to the effect
of wind and rain, certain roofs and skylights became defective, and as
they were not repaired certain rooms in due course became uninhabit-
able. The tenant claimed damages for breach of the landlord's covenant
to repair.
Lord Justice Scott speaking for the court, reversed Du Parcq J.
in the court below, and held that the landlord was not responsible
for the effects of wear and tear, or for any consequential damage
flowing from the wear and tear. However, Scott L.J., emphasized
the unusualness of the situation, commenting that:
• .. Our task is not quite the ordinary one, as we have to construe the
words removed from their normal context of a tenant's covenant, and
transported into the text of a landlord's covenant. The result of this
incorporation is to produce a topsy-turvey covenant by a landlord, seek-
ing to measure his obligation as landlord in an underlease by the scope
of his commitment as tenant in the head-lease.13
The Lord Justice went on to explain that the phrase "fair wear
and tear" covers two classes of disrepair, (a) that caused by the
normal operation of natural causes, wind and weather, and (b) that
caused by the tenant in the course of the fair (or reasonable) use
of the premises.14
The meaning of the repairing covenant, as given in Haskell v.
Marlow was commented upon by Lord Justice Scott. He states that
the covenant as interpreted in the Haskell case, throws upon the
covenantor a positive duty of stepping in and spending money, in
order to stop the wear and tear due to natural elements and tenant's
ordinary uses of the premises. An obligation, which he did not agree
to perform is thus placed on the shoulders of the covenantor. The
learned judge asks:
At what stage in the process of natural decay does the duty arise to
effect repairs and prevent the further ingress of the elements? On the
first leak? If so, the exception is made meaningless. Upon nature's
enlargement of the leak? Where is the line to be drawn? There is no
such limitation of degree in the exception. In my view, the mere opera-
tion of normal wind and weather does not at any stage, confer on the
covenantee the right to call on the covenantor to come in and effect
repairs, in order to prevent further effects of wind and weather.15
Three years ago, the English Court of Appeal gave clear indica-
tion of dissatisfaction with the Taylor case. In Brown v. Davies,16
Romer L.J., agreeing with Evershed M.R., stated the court's view,
that Taylor v. Webb was a highly exceptional case, and that the
covenant there was in a most unusual form. He added that:
33 Ibid. at p. 596.
14 Ibid. at p. 597.
15 Ibid. at p. 600.
16 [1957] 3 W.L.R. 818, [1957] 3 All E.R. 401 (C.A.).
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It seems to me that the law as laid down by Tindal C.J. in Gutteridge v.
Munyard is still the general law, and was not intended to be over-
ruled by this court in Taylor v. Webb. Nor, indeed, was the statement
of the law by Tindall C.J. brought to the attention of the court in that
case.1 7
Although this comparison of Taylor v. Webb with the Cutteridge
case by Romer L.J. was obiter, it illustrated the court's attitude
towards the Webb decision, and its reluctance to be bound by it.
In Regis Property Co. Ltd. v. Dudley'8 the Law Lords, in affirm-
ing the Court of Appeal in the instant case, and the obiter in the
Brown case, specifically agreed with Talbot J. in the Haskell case
and overruled Taylor v. Webb. Here a rent-controlled flat was let
to a tenant on a monthly tenancy under an agreement in writing.
Under the tenancy agreement, the tenant undertook to keep "the
interior of the flat together with all the fixtures and fittings . . .
in good and substantial repair, and clean sanitary condition (fair
wear and tear and damage by accidental fire excepted)." The tenant
contracted to keep the baths, sinks, etc., clean and open, and in
proper repair and order, and be responsible for damages by his
failure to do so. The landlord had the burden of all exterior repairs,
of all interior repairs caused by fair wear and tear, and of certain
plumbing.
It was held that the exception clause in the tenant's repairing
covenant, meant that the tenant was responsible for consequential
damage resulting from the fair wear and tear defect. Viscount
Simonds, in expressing the court's ruling, quotes and upholds the
judgment of Talbot J., and states that Haskell v. Marlow should be
reinstated by the House of Lords, replacing Taylor v. Webb.
It is not entirely clear whether prior to the Regis Property case,
the law in Canada was that expressed in Taylor v. Webb or Haskell v.
Marlow. Canadian cases interpreting the exception clause (especially
its scope), are rare. Ostensibly, Taylor v. Webb was followed in
British Columbia in Bartram v. Rempel,19 where O'Halloran J.A.
expressly considered that Taylor v. Webb overruled Haskell v.
Marlow.
In the Ontario case of Hall v. Campbellford Cloth Co. Ltd.,20
the fair wear and tear exception clause in the tenant's repairing
covenant was present. However, this clause was not in issue, con-
sequently it was not defined in the judgment. Here, the roof of a
curling rink, held under a lease, collapsed, owing to the accumula-
tion of an "abnormal amount" of snow. The landlord's action for
damages against the tenant was successful, since the court felt that
the "abnormal amount" of snow was outside the exception in the
tenant's repairing covenant.
17 Ibid. at p. 408.
18 Supra, footnote 1.
19 [1950] 4 D.L.R. 442 (B.C. C.A.).
20 [1944] O.W.N. 202, [1944] 2 D.L.R. 247.
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Although Taylor v. Webb was English law at the time, it is
submitted that the court could have arrived at their decision by
interpreting the covenant according to Haskell v. Marlow. The ten-
ant would be responsible for the consequential damage resulting
from the accumulation of snow. This view would incorporate Has-
keZl v. Marlow as Ontario law at that time. However, the court held
the tenant liable, because the "abnormal amount" of snow was out-
side the exception in the tenant's repairing covenant; perhaps it may
be implied that the court adopted Taylor v. Webb as part of the law
of Ontario, since Haskell v. Marlow was not followed.
What is the resultant effect of the Regis Property case on
Canadian law? Although no Canadian cases have yet been decided
on the fair wear and tear exception since the Regis case, it is prob-
able that Regis Property, being a House of Lords decision, will be
adopted in most Canadian jurisdictions. Then a tenant with a fair
wear and tear exception in his lease has the responsibility of avoid-
ing consequential damage stemming originally from a fair wear and
tear defect, even though a landlord does not repair the fair wear
and tear defect. It is submitted that the only remedy a tenant may
have, where he has informed the landlord in such a situation, is an
estoppel against the landlord from proceeding against him. The Regis
Property case still leaves unanswered the question of drawing the
line between direct and consequential damage, as Scott L.J. so aptly
noted.2 1 These issues still have to be contended with in our jurisdic-
tion today.
ROBERT M. KERNERMAN
HARVEY v. R. G. O'DELL LTD. - VIcARIous LIABILITY - JOINT TORT-
FEASoRS - MASTER'S RIGHT TO INDEMNITY FROM SERVANT - In the
recent English case of Harvey v. R. G. O'Dell Ltd.,I it was held that
a master has a right to be indemnified by his servant for losses
incurred as a result of the servant's torts.
In this case, Galway, a servant of the defendants who were in
the business of building and repairing, was employed as a store-
keeper. He was instructed to choose a fellow workman and travel
out of town to carry out certain repairs. Galway chose the plaintiff
to accompany him. They travelled to their place of employment
on Galway's motorcycle and sidecar which Galway had used on
other occasions for his master's benefit. After working several
hours, the pair went to the nearest town to get tools and have
lunch. On their return trip, an accident occurred in which Galway
was killed and the plaintiff was seriously injured. The accident
occurred as a result of Galway's negligence. The plaintiff brought
21Supra, footnote 15.
Mr. Kernerman is in the second year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
3.[19582 2 Q.B. 78, also reported at [19582 1 All E.R. 657, [19583 2
W.L.R. 473.
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